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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLICE: FACT AND FICTION
Comments upon The Supreme Court and the Police: A Police Viewpoint
by Vincent L. Broderick
A. KENNETH PYE*
Our subject is the Supreme Court and the Police.
More specifically we are discussing Mapp,*
Escobedo,2 Wong Suni and their progeny. In the
background are Gideon,4 Griffin,5 Coppedge6 and
Douglas,7 for the cases dealing with pretrial
procedure lose much of their significance unless a
defendant has counsel at trial and an opportunity
for an appeal in which he is represented by a
lawyer who has the benefit of a trial transcript.
Our subject implies that the Supreme Court
cases dealing with pre-arraignment criminal
procedure have had an impact upon the police and
that the police have objections to them. It is
therefore appropriate to explore the nature of these
objections and to comment upon their validity.
Few continue to assert that the decisions have
caused crime. Hopefully, Deputy Attorney General
Ramsey Clark buried that canard last summer
when he stated:
Court rules do not cause crime. People do not
commit crime because they know they cannot
be questioned by police before presentment,
or even because they feel they will not be
convicted.... In the long run, only the
elimination of the cause of crime can make a
significant and lasting difference in the
incidence of crime.8
Mr. Broderick voices the objection of the
policemen on the firing line in expressing concern
* Professor of Law, Duke University.
The paper that is the subject of Professor Pye's
comments appeared in the September, 1966 issue of
the Journal, at p. 271.
At the time when Professor Pye participated in the
Northwestern University Conference on The Supreme
Court and the Police: 1966, he was an Associate Dean
at Georgetown University Law Center.
I Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).2Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
3 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
4 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).5 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
6 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
8 Quoted in Bazelon, Law and Order Without Justice,
Address before the New York Civil Liberties Union,
New York, New York, February 22, 1966.
that the decisions may impair society's capacity to
prevent and deter crime, and its ability to assem-
ble evidence of the quality and quantity sufficient
to assure the conviction of the guilty.
The concern is based on two premises: (1) In
order to accomplish their mission the police must
be permitted to detain the suspicious, search
them, and interrogate those arrested for a reason-
able time; (2) Any impairment of police effective-
ness will result in fewer defendants being caught,
prosecuted, convicted and imprisoned. 9
Implicit in the first premise is a concept of
police investigative procedure in which a defendant
may be arrested before it is determined that it is
"more likely than not" that he has committed an
offense. The probability of his guilt and the
decision whether to charge may not be made until
after he has been subjected to an interrogation
designed to elicit an incriminating statement."0
Mr. Broderick puts it in these words, "Arrest...
very often necessarily takes place at the beginning
rather than the end of an investigation; often
before there has been identification of the arrestee
or even verification of the crime to be charged","
and again, "arrest often initiates rather than com-
pletes the investigatory process". 2 I have no
quarrel with his observation if he is referring to an
arrest made by an officer who has observed a
crime or who has been in hot pursuit of a suspect
identified by a reliable source as the perpetrator
of the offense. I must part company with him,
however, if he is speaking of the arrest of ten
different suspects for the same offense under
circumstances where it is not "more likely than
not" that any one of them committed the crime
9 See Vorenberg, Police Detention and Interrogation
of Uncounselted Suspects: The Supreme Court and the
States, 44 B. U. L. RaV. 423, 433 (1964).
10 Cf. ALl, A MODEL CODE op PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE, Art. 3.01 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1966).
" Broderick, The Supreme Court and the Police: A
Police Viewpoint, 57 J. Cvion. L., C. &. P.S. 271, 281
(1966).
2 Address by Vincent L. Broderick, The Supreme
Court and the Police: A Police Viewpoint, April 29,
1966.
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and where the object of the interrogation is to
persuade one of the ten to incriminate himself.
The concept of arresting a citizen only after
there is probable cause to believe that he has
committed an offense is not novel. The principle
that the police should not search him, his automo-
bile, or the place where he lives except when inci-
dent to a valid arrest or after a warrant has been
procured on the basis of a complaint which alleges
facts constituting probable cause, is not an innova-
tion in criminal procedure. These are the tradi-
tional concepts which underlie the fourth amend-
ment. Since Wolf," the mandate of the fourth
amendment has been applied to the states. If the
police had observed the law as pronounced by the
Supreme Court, Wolf, Mapp, and Wong Sun
would have had no effect. The objections to Mapp
and Wong Sun can really be stated in this manner:
We did not protest when the Court held that
the fourth amendment was applicable to the
states. We did not object when the courts
held that arrests for investigation and searches
without a warrant were unconstitutional.
What offends us is that the Court now says
that we must pay attention to its rantings.
The recent search and seizure cases have had
impact only because many police departments
deliberately ignored the requirements of the fourth
amendment during the period of more than a
decade which intervened between Wolf and Mapp.
The objections to Escobedo stand on a slightly
different basis. It is understandable how the
police would have concluded that they could
legally bar a defendant from consulting with his
lawyer during a police interrogation in view of the
decisions in Cicenia4 and Crooker. 5 The Escobedo
case did constitute a change in the law. However,
the number of defendants who will have already
retained counsel before their arrest is sufficiently
small that most policemen can tolerate the holding
in Escobedo as a minor irritant. It is the broad
language of the opinion and some of the cases
which have followed it which cause concern.
No doubt there is a genuine fear that the Court
may invalidate lengthy secret interrogations of
defendants under circumstances where they have
received neither the advice of a lawyer nor a
judicial officer. But the prompt presentment
statutes of most states probably make such
interrogations illegal now. If the police attempted
ia Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
'4 Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
"Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
to comply with these statutes, there would be
neither the necessity nor the opportunity for a
court to resort to the rubrics of the right to counsel
in an obvious attempt to protect a defendant from
the impairment of his privilege against self-
incrimination and the coercion implicit in interro-
gation in such a setting. The effect of Escobedo is
not that traditional practices have been declared
unlawful, but that in the future an exclusionary
rule under constitutional auspices may actually
exert pressure on the police to discontinue practices
which are already illegal.
I agree with Professor Packer that in a broad
sense these issues pose the question of the kind of
society in which we wish to live. 16 More specifi-
cally, they raise questions of what would be the
effect on the prevention, detection, and prosecution
of crime if our police respected the constitutional
and statutory rights of our citizens? Would any
reduction in the level of efficiency in confession-
seeking be compensated for by a higher degree of
citizen cooperation resulting from improved
community relations? Assuming that police
efficiency would be impaired, are these other
societal values more important than the reduction
in efficiency? 7
I belong to the group which thinks that the
values expressed in the fourth, fifth and sixth and
fourteenth amendments are sufficiently important
to outweigh any reduction in police effectiveness
which may result from a policy of respecting these
rights of the citizenry. I subscribe to the views
expressed elsewhere by Professors Packer 8 and
Paulsen,'19 by my colleagues at Georgetown,
Hogan, Snee" and Dash,2 and by Professors
Foote," Kamisar,2 Sutherland" and others,2 that
16 Packer, Two Modes of the Criminal Process, 113
U. PA. L. REv., 1 (1964).
17 See Pye, Charles Fahy and the Criminal Law, 54
Gxo. L. J. 1055 (1966).18 See note 16, supra.
11 Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third
Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv. 411 (1959).
20 Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its
Rise, Rationale and Rescte, 47 GEo. L. J, 1 (1958).
2" Dash, Crime, Law Enforcement and Justice: The
Prospects for Reform, Address before the National
Civil Liberties Clearing House, Washington, D. C.,
April 12, 1966.
22 Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Neces-
sity in the Law of Arrest? 51 J. CRim. L., C., & P. S.
402 (1960).
2Kamisar, Book Review, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1502
(1963); Kamisar, Illegal Searches and Seizures and
Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue
on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U.
ILL. L. F. 78; Kamisar, Has the Supreme Court Left
19661
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these rights, in the language of Yale Kamisar, are
significant in the "gatehouses as well as the
mansions. 2 6 No useful purpose would be served by
again reiterating the significance of these values in
a free society.
My comments today deal only with the question
of the effect of limiting the power of the police to
arrest on suspicion, to search without a warrant,
and to conduct lengthy interrogations in the
absence of counsel, upon the efficiency of the
criminal process.
There is an urgent need to collect and evaluate
the facts concerning police investigative practices,
decisions whether to prosecute, and court disposi-
tions of cases.
Mr. Broderick's suggestion that we should
undertake pilot projects designed to collect the
information which we do not now know is
excellent.u I add only the caution that we should
be careful that such projects are not designed with
the object of collecting information either to sus-
tain or to refute police objections. They must be
aimed solely at determining the truth, not "assem-
bling the data" for a brief in which the conclusion
has already been reached.
It is unfortunate that the reporters of the pro-
posed A.L.I. Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
did not undertake such studies in depth upon
beginning their work. In June of 1963 I wrote to
the then Reporter urging such action for many of
the same reasons suggested by Mr. Broderick:
.... In recent months I have been particu-
larly concerned with the alleged need of the
police to have a reasonable period of time in
which to detain and interrogate those sus-
pected of crime and the obvious restriction of
human liberty which would result if such
detentions were authorized.
Most of the literature concerns itself with
an attempt to strike some type of balance
between the right of an individual to remain
silent, his right to remain free from police
The Attorney General Far Behind?, Address at the Uni-
versity of Kentucky, December 4, 1965.
24 Sutherland, Due Process and Compelled Confessions,
79 HARv. L. REV. 21 (1965).
21 See Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions
on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIo ST. L. J. 449 (1964).
Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith
and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REV. 483 (1963).
26 Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehonses and
Mansions oJ American Criminal Procedure: From
Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to ... , Criminal Jus-
tice in Our Time (1965).
27 Broderick, supra, note 11.
custody in the absence of probable cause, his
right to counsel, and the need of the police for
some period of interrogation. I have been able
to find very little which actually examines the
question of whether a need really exists.
Unfortunately, we do not have records of
most of the empirical data needed to be known
before the effect of the Mallory Rule and
similar exclusionary rules can be evaluated. I
think that the Institute can perform a val-
uable function in attempting to collect some
of this factual data. We would be in a much
better position to evaluate some of the argu-
ments with reference to the Mallory Rule if
we knew how many cases were not presented
to the Grand Jury, the number of cases in
which an ignoramus was returned, the number
of cases where indictments were dismissed, the
number of cases where convictions were not
obtained, and the number of appellate re-
versals which resulted from the exclusion of
confessions obtained in violation of Rule 5.21
My plea was unavailing. To the best of my
knowledge no systematic study involving the
collection and analysis of data of this type was
conducted before the reporters prepared their
draft. This is not to say that they did not have the
benefit of research and personal experiences. The
Associate Reporter had conducted several out-
standing studies prior to beginning his work on
the Model Code. 9 The Reporter had the benefit of
a study performed by the Office of Criminal
Justice of the Department of Justice of which he
was Director and one being conducted by the
National Crime Commission of which he is
Executive Director. The second has not been
completed. Neither has yet been made available
to other scholars. We may have missed the
opportunity for a full scaled inquiry under im-
partial auspices at a crucial time.
In March of 1965 I approached the Metro-
politan Police Department of the District of
Columbia with a proposal to investigate the
impact of Escobedo with the object of determining
the extent to which police efficiency would be
affected by informing defendants of their rights
during police interrogations.
2 Letter of A. Kenneth Pye to Professor Arthur E.
Sutherland, Jr., June 6, 1963. Professor Sutherland
resigned as Reporter subsequently and has voiced
strong objections to several provisions of the first ten-
tative draft.
2 Cf. Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From
Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CAL.. L. REV. 11 (1962).
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I proposed that such a study be undertaken by
the Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure at
Georgetown which was then being organized with
a policy board composed of outstanding people in
the city of Washington who are involved in the
administration of criminal justice. My proposal
was simple:
Two police precincts of approximately the
same size, the citizens of which come from a
similar socio-economic background, would be
chosen for the purpose of the experiment.
Students would be made available in one of
these precincts, to be designated by the Chief
of Police, on an around-the-clock basis. The
student would perform two purposes. In the
first place he would inform each defendant
who was arrested and brought into the sta-
tion house of his privilege against self-in-
crimination, his right to consult a lawyer, and
of his right to be taken without unnecessary
delay before a committing magistrate, in
language previously determined to be appro-
priate by the Institute Staff after consulta-
tion with police officials. If a police interroga-
tion was conducted after the advice had been
given, the student would be available to serve
as a disinterested witness of what occurred
during the interrogation if the police so desired.
In the event that a confession was offered at
a subsequent trial, the court would have avail-
able an unbiased witness on issues such as the
time when the defendant was booked, the
length of the interrogation, the advice pro-
vided to the defendant, and the defendant's
replies to questions put to him.
No students would be provided the other
precinct. At the end of a trial period each case
which emanated from either precinct would be
studied by the research staff to determine
whether the presence of the student and the
advice rendered by him affected the disposi-
tion of the case. Results in the two precincts
would be compared. The effect, if any, on
police efficiency could be determined. It is
hoped that much could be learned concerning
the best possible means of protecting the rights
of defendants without interfering unnecessarily
with policy efficiency."
It was made dear that we were not wedded to
details and that we understood that substantial
30 Enclosure, Letter of A. Kenneth Pye to Hon.
John B. Layton, March 5, 1965.
problems would have to be overcome before the
project could be put into operation. This proposal
received a courteous but firm disapproval from
the police.
Four months after this rebuff, the United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia told a
Senate Committee that neither his office nor the
police knew whether informing an arrested person
of his right to counsel and permitting him to
consult with counsel would have the effect of
reducing the number of incriminating statements
by "5 percent or 95 percent" of the cases.3
Since October of 1965, the police in the District
have been giving warnings and filing reports of
interrogations in felony cases with the National
Crime Commission, including statements con-
cerning whether the suspect refused to make a
statement without consulting with a lawyer or
requested to see a lawyer. We will obtain some
knowledge from an analysis of this information, if
and when it is made public. Unfortunately we have
not been using this opportunity to its greatest
advantage. Most of the suspects being interro-
gated cannot afford counsel and prior to June of
1966, the warning given informed these people
only that counsel would be provided them when
they arebrought to court. Prior to June of 1966, the
Office of the United States Attorney declined to
instruct the police to inform a suspect that "if he
cannot afford a lawyer and desires to consult one,
that a lawyer will be made available to him" at
the stationhouse, despite the availability of legal
services for this purpose." By not providing a
warning in these terms and by denying access to
counsel who were available, we lost the oppor-
tunity, for six months, of ascertaining how many
persons would request a lawyer if informed that
one was available, and the effect that representa-
31Testimony of Hon. David C. Acheson, Hearings
before the Committee on the District oJ Columbia, 89th
Congress, First Session, 503 (1965), Part II. [herein-
after cited as Part II 1965 Senate Hearings].
"2 See letter of A. Kenneth Pye, Chairman, Board
of Directors, District of Columbia Neighborhood Legal
Services Project to Hon. David C. Acheson, United
States Attorney, August 5, 1965; letter of Mr. Acheson
to Mr. Pye, August 6, 1965; letter of Mr. Pye to Mr.
Acheson, August 9, 1965; letter of Mr. Acheson to
Mr. Pye, August 10, 1965; letter of Mr. Pye to Mr.
Acheson, August 24, 1965. Letter of Julian R. Dugas,
Director, District of Columbia Neighborhood Legal
Services Project to Hon. John B. Layton, Chief, Met-
ropolitan Police Department, August 24, 1965; letter
of Hon. David Bress, United States Attorney, to Mr.
Pye, February 28, 1966; letter of Mr. Pye to Mr. Bress,
March 23, 1966; letter of Mr. Bress to Chief Layton,
May 20, 1966.
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tion of these persons would have on police investi-
gations. The new policy announced in June of
1966, which gives the suggested warning to the
indigent, will permit the accumulation of much
needed data.
The need for a through study should not obscure
the fact that we know a great deal already from
experience in the District of Columbia where the
federal law of search and seizure and limitations
upon police interrogation have been operative in a
municipal setting for some time. Experience in the
District with the law of search and seizure has
demonstrated that the police can operate within
the framework of search and seizure cases some-
times developed in the context of federal law
enforcement. Concepts such as "the appearance to
a reasonable policeman"3 in the determination of
probable cause, "exigent circumstances" which
may permit an entry without a warning,3M the
insufficiency of an affidavit to justify the issuance
of a search warrant,35 the right to seize a weapon
not described in a warrant,36 the right to "stop,
confront and interrogate", 37 and other doctrines
have evolved as a result of judicial interpretations
of the fourth amendment as applied to municipal
law enforcement. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
itself has developed flexible concepts such as the
"moving vehicle" exception,n8 and has declined to
apply some of the highly specific requirements of
the federal law of search and seizure to the states.39
There is every reason to believe that the propriety
of local police actions will be evaluated by a
criteria which will give consideration to the dif-
ference between federal and local law enforcement.
There is little evidence to support the exagger-
ated fears which some have expressed concerning
the impact of rules restricting police practices. The
experience in the District of Columbia with arrests
for investigations suggests that some of the tradi-
tional practices are less useful than many have
thought.
Prior to 1962 the Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment regularly arrested citizens for investigation.
31 Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir.
1958).34 Masiello v. United States, 317 F.2d 121 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
35 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
36 Palmer v. United States, 203 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir.
1953).37 Keiningham v. United States, 307 F.2d 632 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
38 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
39 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
It was asserted that police effectiveness would be
impaired severely if they were not permitted to
arrest for investigation and then interrogate to
determine guilt. The value of such a practice was
studied by the Commissioner's Committee on
Police Arrests for Investigation in 1961 and 1962.
The results were published in the Horsky Report."
Some of its findings have been summarized by my
colleague, George W. Shadoan:
The so-called Horsky Report indicates that,
"Of the 1,356 persons held for 8 hours or more
in 1960, only 16, or 1.2 percent, were charged."
The others were released without any charge
after eight hours or more of detention. The
report further states: "Of the 690 persons held
for more than 12 hours in 1960 only seven-
1 percent were charged." Again, the remainder
were released after this prolonged detention
without any charge. Apparently the detention
had little success in the acquisition of a con-
fession. Turning to the specific crimes for
which a confession is often said to be essential,
we find the Horsky Report stating: "In the
two years 1960-61, 221 persons were arrested
for investigation of homicide, of whom all but
one were released. During the same period 120
persons were arrested for investigation of
rape, of whom 3 were charged. For robbery,
the figures were 1,998 and 51; for house-
breaking, 1,682 and 67."41
We sometimes forget that interrogation is only
one technique of crime solution. Mr. Broderick
takes Justice Goldberg to task for implying that
investigation and interrogation are separate
functions. He argues that interrogation is an
integral part of all investigations. However, this
does not mean that there cannot be effective
investigation without interrogation in many cases.
It depends upon what is sought to be ascertained.
Superintendent Wilson, in testimony before the
Senate Committee on the District of Columbia,
described the investigation process in terms of
police obligations. He concluded that the police
have the "obligation" to investigate the state-
ment of the suspect, to check his identity, to
obtain statements from victims and witnesses, to
make a laboratory analysis of physical evidence, to
4 Report and Recommendations of the Commis-
sioners Committee on Police Arrests for Investigation
(1962).
41 Shadoan, Are Courts Perpetuatiug Crime Through
The Mallory Rude?, 26 Tim YOUNG LAwYER 3 (1962).
42 Broderick, supra note 11.
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search for the murder weapon and loot, and
to conduct a line-up for victims and witnesses.0
He makes a good case for the need for a reason-
ble time in which to investigate, although he may
be less persuasive in his argument that such an
investigation must precede presentation before a
magistrate. What seems significant to me is that
his description of the process makes it clear that
much of the investigation can be conducted with-
out any resort to interrogation. I find it difficult
to understand why many crimes could not be
solved through the steps which he outlines, with-
out interrogation, if there was probable cause
before the defendant was arrested.
Limitations on interrogation practices may
affect the clearance rate, because the police may
not have the opportunity, in Mr. Broderick's
words "to interrogate burglars arrested in the act
who are suspected of having committed a series of
other burglaries throughout the city".4 But this
does not mean that the burglar "caught in the
act" will not be prosecuted or convicted; it does
not mean that he would be prosecuted for the
other crimes even if he confessed to having com-
mitted them; it does not mean that he would have
been sentenced to consecutive sentences even if he
had been prosecuted and convicted.
The United States Attorney of the District of
Columbia has recognized that a major reason why
the clearance rate may drop is "because it is well
known that when a suspect is apprehended by the
police and if he could be questioned about other
offenses committed by him, multiple crimes are
solved which would not otherwise be cleared."45
There is clearly a social value in solving such
crimes, but it is a social value much different and
less significant than solving an offense committed
by a criminal who will be able to avoid prosecution
or conviction of any offense unless he can be
interrogated.
Understandably there are some cases of this
nature. Limitations of interrogations may affect
proof of guilt in a few cause celebres such as Mr.
Broderick's "solitary killers where the only
witnesses to their crimes are dead." This is the
real loss which may result from police work which
is consistent with the Constitution. These cases are
413 Testimony of 0. W. Wilson, Hearings on H. R.
7525 and S. 486, Before the Senate Committee on the
District of Columbia, 88th Congress, First Session, Part
I at 310-11 (1963).44 Broderick, supra note 11.45 Bress, Who Speaks for the Police, 13 FED. BAR
NEWS No. 3 (1966).
important but they constitute a minute per-
centage of the crimes committed. They are not so
numerous that they have a major impact upon the
administration of criminal justice. Other methods
of solving them may develop if unlawful arrests
and lengthy interrogations fall by the wayside.
In the routine cases which constitute the bulk
of our criminal business there are many other
factors which intervene in the criminal process
between the close of the police investigation and
the final disposition of the case which may be
much more significant in determining how many
persons will be prosecuted, convicted, or im-
prisoned, than the efficiency of the police in
procuring confessions or locating stolen property
in the possession of the defendant. It does not
follow that the ability of the police to produce
more confessions will have any significant effect on
the degree to which society exerts its sanctions
against criminal offenders.
Experience with the McNabb-Mallory Rtle in
the District of Columbia may demonstrate my
point.
The McNabb case in 194846 resulted in cries of
doom and an attempt to obtain a statute over-
ruling its effect, but when the furor died down the
administration of criminal justice continued with
little or no noticeable change. In 1957 the Mallory47
decision was rendered. The then Chief of Police
stated that the decision rendered the Police
Department "almost totally ineffective."'4
However, when efforts to obtain a statutory
change failed, things again quieted down. The
extent to which the police obeyed Rule 5 between
1958 and 1962 is problematical. Between those
years the decisions of the Court of Appeals per-
mitted the police to evade or ignore the Mallory
Ride and to develop admissible evidence in several
situations: (1) A defendant could be arrested after
5:00 P.M. and interrogated until the next day
despite the fact that municipal judges were
available during the interval.4 (2) After a con-
fession had been obtained unlawfully a defendant
could be taken before a magistrate who would
inform him of his rights and appoint counsel for
him from the "mourner's bench" in the court
room. The next day the defendant could be visited
41 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).47 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
48 The Washington Post and Times-Herald, June 26,
1958, B, p. 1, Col. 6, quoted in Hogan and Snee, supra
n. 20 at 17.49 Porter v. United States, 258 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
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by the police and they could obtain a reaffirmation
of the initial confession which the defendant
probably did not know was inadmissible. The
second confession would then be admitted.50 (3)
An exculpatory statement obtained from a
defendant during a period of unlawful delay could
be used to impeach his credibility if he testified to
a different story at trial, thus presenting the
defendant with the dilemma of either not taking
the stand or being subjected to damaging im-
peachment. Some of the trial judges permitted the
use of an inculpatory statement for the same
purpose.-" (4) A confession obtained during a
period of unlawful delay could be used either to
locate witnesses against the defendant in a prosecu-
tion for the crime for which he was arrested or to
determine his inodis operandi and follow it up with
a lineup before victims of other unsolved crimes
involving the same "M.O." The defendant might
then be prosecuted for this crime if a victim could
identify him. The charge for which he had been
arrested originally might be dropped.1
2
The only real sanctions for violation of the
Mallory rule during these years was the exclusion
of the confession, testimony dsecribing a re-
enactment of the offense during a period of unlaw-
ful detention,n and fingerprints obtained during
such a period54 The use of the derivative evidence
seemed to permit an accommodation with the
rule and the clamor against the Mallory rule
became more subdued, until 1962 when the Court
of Appeals began to backtrack and to limit the use
of derivative evidence,55 required prompt present-
ment even at night when a magistrate was avail-
able, and thus shortened the period of time which
would be regarded as a "necessary delay".56 These
50 Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C.
Cir. 1960); Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675
(D.C. Cir. 1960).5 Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir.
1960).
52 Payne v. United States, 294 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir.
1961); Smith and Bowdoin v. United States, 324 F.2d
879 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
53 See Naples v. United States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
55 Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); see Smith and Anderson v. United States,
344 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1965); McLindon v. United
States, 329 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Compare Bailey
v. United States, 328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1964) with
Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir.
1964).
56 Jones v. United States, 307 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.
1962). The concept of unnecessary delay was narrowed
further in later cases by some panels of the Court. See
decisions followed shortly after the prohibition
against arrests for investigation and resulted in a
renewed demand for legislative nullification of the
Mallory rule.
In the Spring of 1962, legislation was proposed
which would have abrogated the Mallory rule
and permitted six hours of interrogation of sus-
pects.5 7 A Special Committee of the Bar Associa-
tion of the District of Columbia recommended
approval of the bills with modifications." The
Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure of the
Association opposed both bills. 9 The Association
at an open meeting voiced its disapproval of each
bill by an overwhelming vote.6
In the Fall of 1963, and the Spring of 1964, the
Senate Committee on the District of Columbia
held hearings on various proposals to modify the
Mallory rule including H.R. 5726, which later
became the model for the interrogation provisions
of the A. L. I. Model Code.61 That bill would have
permitted a period of not more than six hours of
questioning. It also required that prior to question-
ing the arrested person should be advised, by the
officers having custody of him, of his right to
remain silent and that upon request he would be
afforded reasonable opportunity to consult with
counsel of his choosing. Mr. Katzenbach, then
Deputy Attorney General, and Mr. Acheson, the
then United States Attorney, supported this
legislation.62
The Senate District Committee, by a split vote,
favorably reported the legislation almost simul-
taneously with the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Escobedo case.n The
bill did not reach the Senate floor.
In the Fall of 1964, the policy of the Govern-
ment changed. On October 27, 1964, Mr. Acheson
Spriggs v. United States, 335 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Alston v. United States, 348 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir.
1965). But see Perry v. United States, 347 F.2d 813
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
57 See Hearings on H. R. 7525 and S. 486 Before
the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, 88th
Congress, First Session (1963).
5 Report of Special Committee on Killough Case and
Related Matters, 30 J. B. A. D. C. 164 (1963).
59 Criminal Law Comnmittee Report, 30 J. B. A. D. C.
184 (1963).
60 Minutes of Bar Association for the District of
Columbia, April 16, 1963.
1 See Hearings on H. R. 7525 and S. 486 S. 486
Before the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia,
88th Congress, First Session (1963). [hereinafter cited
as 1963 Senate Hearings].
12 1963 Senate Hearings 431-451.
63 Senate Report No. 1172, 88th Congress, Second
Session (July 8, 1964).
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wrote to the Chief of Police:
It is probable that no interrogation prior to
appearance before the committing magistrate
can produce any admissible evidence, except
a statement which is volunteered, or given in
response to questions, at the scene of the
arrest, or immediately thereafter....
As a simple rule of thumb, I should think
that it would suffice to instruct your men
that persons under arrest are not to be
questioned regarding facts of the offense
following their arrival at precinct or head-
quarters, until after their appearance before
the magistrate and appointment or retention
of counsel .... 64
The Deputy Chief of Police instructed all police
to comply with these instructions. In a letter of
November 7, 1964, Mr. Acheson made it dear that
the October letter related solely to detention for
the purpose of interrogation, and did not refer to
non-interrogative, post-arrest procedure. He wrote
that "while my letter of October 27 is an accurate
statement of the law regarding interrogations it
does not purport to deal with non-interrogative
means of verification". 65
In the Spring of 1965, the Senate District Com-
mittee held hearings on S. 1526 and H. R. 5688,
bills containing the same provisions as H. R. 5726
which had been approved the previous year. 6  On
April 27, 1965, the Deputy Attorney General, Mr.
Clark, the Director of the Office of Criminal
Justice, Mr. James Vorenberg, and Mr. Acheson,
expressed the view that the Committee should
not take action until the Advisory Committee of
the American Law Institute met in early June to
consider the first draft of the proposed Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure which would
be submitted to it at that time by Mr. Vorenberg
in his capacity as Reporter for the project. The
Committee acquiesced. On July 15, 1965, Mr.
Clark and Mr. Acheson again appeared before the
Committee. s At that time they announced that
on the preceding day Mr. Acheson had revoked the
policy enunciated in his October and November
letters and had instructed the Chief of Police that
"Letter of Hon. David C. Acheson to Hon. Robert
V. Murray, October 27, 1964.
65 Letter of Hon. David C. Acheson to Hon. Robert
V. Murray, November 7, 1964.61 Hearings Before the Committee on the District of
Columbia, United States Senate, 89th Congress, First
Session on H. R. 5688 and S. 1526, Part I (1965), [here-
inafter cited as Part I, 1965 Senate Hearings].
6 Part 1, 1965 Senate Hearings, 29-81.
"Part II, 1965 Senate Hearings, 494-513.
he could permit his officers to engage in three hours
of uninterrupted interrogation if prior to such
interrogation the arrested person was warned:
1. You have been placed under arrest. You
are not required to say anything to us at any
time or to answer any questions. Anything you
say may be used as evidence in court.
2. You have a right to call a lawyer, rela-
tive or friend. He may be present here and
you have a right to talk to him.
3. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one may
be appointed for you when you first go to
court.
69
The Deputy Attorney General and Mr. Acheson
opposed the passage of the bills before the Com-
mittee despite the support voiced for a similar bill
the previous year and their administrative action
which permitted practices almost the same as
those which would have been authorized by the
billy The Deputy Attorney General indicated that
one reason for the Department's opposition was to
avoid a premature test of the constitutionality of
proposed proceduresYl He stated that the proce-
dure outlined in Mr. Acheson's letter "does not
run the risk of constitutional invalidation of the
standards involved, as would a statute." 2 He
feared that if Mr. Acheson's instructions were
enacted into law, "confessions taken under the
statute would be tested in the courts and the
statute itself might fail." 3 Experience under the
Acheson letter might permit the development of
"facts, technology, and comprehensiblelanguage 74
which could result in a statute which would be
able to withstand constitutional attack. Admini-
strative regulation provided flexibility not possible
in a statute.75
Mr. Acheson indicated that he had changed his
policy of October, 1964, because recent cases made
it "dear that there really wasn't any reliable
guideline in the Court of Appeals as to a time
period which would be permissible for questioning
under Rule 5(a)" and because "it seemed to us that
perhaps we are paying a price that was a little too
high in return for an attempt to follow the case
law."7 6
The majority of the Committee disagreed with
11 Ibid. at 497-498.
10 Id. at 507.
71 Id. at 506.72 Id. at 496.73 Id. at 505.74 Id. at 496.
75 Id. at 501.76 Id. at 508.
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the advisability of delaying Congressional action
and favorably reported a bill placing the procedures
recommended by the Department in statutory
form 7
The bill was passed by the Senate.78 The so-
called Omnibus Crime Bill, which contains pro-
visions abrogating the Mallory Ride and authoriz-
ng arrests for investigation, was passed by the
House.79 Conferees have been appointed by the
two houses.
In August the Chief of Police by General Order
authorized interrogations for not more than three
hours exclusive of interruptions. The procedure
went into effect in October.80
What have been the effects of the McNabb-
Mallory Rule? We will probably never know the
full answer, but some date is available.
The clearance rate has declined from around
50% to 34.1%; and decreased 10% since 1961.81
The present figure still compares favorably-to the
extent that comparisons are possible-with
clearance rates in other cities, but the decrease is
significant. We do know that more crimes are
being committed, more crimes are being solved,
but the percentage is decreasing. Part of it may be
the result of restricting interrogation. But there is
very little reason for concluding that the end of
arrests for investigation and the Mallory rule were
the only, or even the major, causes of the phenom-
ena. The extent to which the increase in reported
offenses has resulted from juvenile crimes must be
examined. We may find that much of the so-called
"crime wave" which has resulted in unsolved
crimes and a decreased clearance rate is the work of
juveniles who are investigated under procedures
largely unaffected by the restrictions to which
objections have been made.
Furthermore, it does not follow that the clear-
ance rate will necessarily improve if interrogation
is permitted. For the last six months the police
have been permitted to interrogate in felony cases
for a period not to exceed three hours if warnings
are given prior to the start of the questioning.82
During five of the same six months last year
interrogation in the stationhouse was prohibited.
During the same period of the winter of 1963-1964
the Mallory rule, generally interpreted at that
7 Senate Report No. 600, 89th Congress, First
Session (August 13, 1965).
78 S. 1526, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
11 H. R. 5688, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965).
80 General Order No. 9-3, series 1964, August 11,
1965, reprinted in Part II, 1965 Senate Hearings 499.
11 See Appendix III.
82 See note 80, supra.
time to permit brief interrogations at the station-
house, was in effect. My research assistant, Mr.
Peter S. Ring, has compiled the clearance rates
for the months during November, December,
January, February and March of each year. The
results reveal that the clearance rate is the highest
during the months in which interrogation was
prohibited and hits its lowest points during the
months in which interrogation preceded by a
warning was permitted.P Indeed, the average
clearance rate declined over 10% during the latter
period (from 35.9 to 25.5%). The statistics be-
come even more significant in view of the Chief of
Police's recent testimony that admissions or state-
ments are being obtained in approximately one
half of the cases in which interrogations are being
conducted. The extent to which the failure to
obtain statements in the other cases is the product
of the warnings is unclear. However, both the
former Chief of Police and the former United
States Attorney have testified that a warning of
the right to remain silent was given routinely in
the District before the Acheson letter required that
it be done." Hence the fact of a warning of the
right to remain silent may be a constant factor in
the equation.
I do not suggest that the statistics establish that
the clearance rate has not been affected by the
Mallory rule. The elasticity of the concept of
"clearances" makes it difficult to make any definite
conclusions. It is possible that the trend of the
last five months may change. I only suggest that
the data now available does not support the
repeated assertions that the right to interrogate is
a panacea for a dropping clearance rate.
In any case the clearance rate is not the crucial
indicator of the effectiveness of the criminal
process. If felonies are not solved, criminals can-
not be prosecuted. It does not follow that crimi-
nals will be prosecuted for felonies if crimes are
solved, even if they have confessed to the crimes.
There are many other factors which affect the
decision of whether to charge the defendant with a
felony than whether he has admitted guilt.
The figures available in my jurisdiction indicate
that only a small percentage of those who are
arrested for felonies are actually charged with these
offenses. The number of indictments last year is
less than the number in any of the years between
1956 and 19615 The percentage of convictions
remains almost the same regardless of the number
83 See Appendix IV.
1"1963 Senate Hearings.88 See Appendix I.
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charged (76.2% to 82.5%)6. The percentage of
defendants who are imprisoned fluctuates within a
very narrow range (67.3% to 74.3%) regardless of
the number who are convicted.F Only a magician
could find any correlation between interrogation
practices and the rate of prosecution, conviction or
imprisonment.
During the last three years there have been
over 83,000 serious offenses reported in the District
of which over 58,000 were felonies."' The police
have arrested an average of over 9,000 persons for
felonies each year. 9 As I indicated earlier I do
not know the exact number of the offenses or
arrests which involved juveniles. A substantial
percentage of the defendants who were originally
arrested for felonies are charged with and convicted
of misdemeanors. During the three year period
less than 4,000 persons were charged with felonies
(or indictable misdemeanors) in our District
Cout.9° Between 22% and 24% of those charged
were not convicted. 9 Dismissals accounted for
almost two-thirds of the cases in which no convic-
tion occurred. 2 Only 312 defendants were acquit-
ted (including verdicts of not guilty by insanity)
during the three year period.93 Slightly over 3,012
defendants were convicted. Of these, less than
2,200 (2167) received sentences of imprisonment.
Between 25% and 30% received probation or
flnes.9 Some of those who were convicted and
sentenced to prison obtained reversals of their
cases in the Court of Appeals, but contrary to
another myth, almost all of these were convicted
of some offense upon remand. 95
Last year 681 defendants were sentenced to
imprisonment as a result of felony convictions
when over 23,000 felonies were reported and over
12,000 felony arrests were made. The impact of
an opportunity to interrogate upon the criminal
process, when compared with the other factors
obviously operative, must be relatively insignifi-
cant in such a system, except for the rare cases
which may be incapable of solution without interro-
gation.
A comparison of the five month periods of
6 Ibid.
87 Id.
83 See Appendix II.
8DAnnual Reports, Metropolitan Police Department




:5 See Appendix V.
6 Appendix I, Appendix III.
November through March for the last three years
shows no correlation between the opportunity to
interrogate and the number of defendants charged
with felonies. 97 During the winter of 1963-1964,
459 defendants were indicted, during the same
period last year, the number rose to 527; during the
last five months it dropped to 488. 93 Thus, the
number of persons indicted, like the clearance rate,
has actually dropped since interrogations have
been authorized.
I wish to make it dear that I am not arguing
that we will solve more crimes or charge more
defendants without interrogation or that the data
available supports such a proposition. I am simply
suggesting that the data available does not support
the contrary position. It is extremely difficult to
reach any definite conclusions. The presence of the
juvenile crime factor, the probability that the
police continued to interrogate in some cases when
ordered not to do so, and are now refraining from
interrogation in some cases when permitted to do
so, the necessity for a comparison of longer time
periods for statistical validity, all limit the per-
missible conclusions which can be reached at this
time. Fortunately, the excellent staff of the D. C.
Crime Commission is studying these matters in
depth and will soon report. I urge only that we
refrain from predicting that lower clearance rates,
prosecution rates or conviction rates will neces-
sarily accompany restrictions upon interrogations
until we develop data to support such assertions.
The police have a much stronger case when they
question the disposition of the provable cases
which they bring to the prosecutor only to en-
counter a "nolle" or a reduction in charges because
of a shortage of prosecutors, absence of facilities, or
pressure from judges who fear docket congestion.
Such prosecution practices may act to the detri-
ment of police morale and the public safety.
A decision to prosecute most weapons cases and
most burglaries as misdemeanors may have much
more serious consequences upon the system for the
administration of criminal justice than restrictions
placed on interrogations. It is quite strange that
many of the same policemen who criticize appellate
court judges for rendering decisions which impair
police effectiveness are often vocal supporters of
trial judges who join them in the criticism of
appellate courts, but who also regularly exert
pressure on prosecutors to keep "police court"





prosecutors to permit a defendant to "cop out",
who frequently suggest to a prosecutor that he
transfer a case to a colleague who is unfamiliar
with it rather than tolerate a delay until the first
prosecutor can finish the case he is trying, or who
assign additional judges to criminal cases in the
spring in order to dispose of as many cases as
possible before lengthy judicial vacations begin in
the summer, despite the effect of such action on
already overworked prosecutors.
I regret that Mr. Broderick did not address him-
self to the impact which police practices, such as
detention without probable cause and lengthy
interrogations, have upon community relations
and the effect of these attitudes upon police
effectiveness.
It is questionable if a police force can ever reach
its maximum level of effectiveness in a democracy
if it does not have the cooperation of the com-
munity which it serves in performing its duties.
In the ghettos of our urban cities there is fear,
distrust, and lack of cooperation. Studies of
attitudes show that concern over police brutality
is an issue more important to many than housing
or education. My own experience has revealed
few instances of even a colorable claim of police
brutality, but the issue has symbolic significance
well beyond its true dimensions. We can append
community relation units to police departments
and we can even set up citizen review boards, but
I suspect that the attitude of hostility will continue
as long as the citizens of these ghettos are sub-
jected to unlawful arrests and lengthy incom-
municado interrogations.
The fact that most of the people who are
affected are poor and members of minority groups
accentuates the problems. We have raised their
expectations, perhaps unrealistically, in the govern-
ment's guarantee of civil rights and in the War
Against Poverty. It is difficult for the poor Negro
to understand our support of his right to vote,
when we are ignoring his right not to be arrested
without probable cause. He may think we are
being hypocritical when we recognize his need for
a lawyer to represent him in a dispute with a
public welfare administrator or a local merchant,
but deny him access to a lawyer when he is being
interrogated by a policeman.
In a middle class section of the city the police-
man can look for support and assistance from the
residents. Why is this not true in our ghettos where
most of the victims of crime live, a group at least
as large as those who commit it? Is it not the
time to question whether the police practices
struck down in Mapp, Wong Sun, and Escobedo
are in part responsible for the attitude of many of
the members of our minority groups towards the
police and the law? Is it not time to investigate
whether a change of attitude and a willingness to
cooperate could be developed if these practices
were eradicated? Is it not possible that such a
change in community attitudes could improve
police effectiveness to the point that it would
more than compensate for the loss of efficiency in
confession-seeking which may have accompanied
the end of these practices.
There is another area in which community
relations must be considered if the police are to
operate as effectively as possible. I speak now not
of the residents of the community, but of the
bench and bar. The trust and support of these
institutions is vitally necessary to the police.
One possible effect of cases such as Mapp, Wong
Sun, and Mallory may be to affect police testimony
rather than police actions. Mr. Kuh has suggested
that the initial reaction of the police in New York
to Mapp may have resulted in "an increase,
significant in its proportions, in accommodations
by police officers of their stories, not always of
their actions, to law." 99 All of us are familiar with
cases where long-time narcotics offenders throw
vials containing heroin into gutters in front of
approaching persons known to be police officers;
situations where professional gamblers leave
numbers tickets in full view on the front seats of
automobiles which by chance have been stopped
for violations of minor traffic regulations; cases
in which defendants who denied guilt in the
presence of witnesses when arrested nevertheless
"spontaneously" admit guilt to an officer in a
squad car on the way to the station; cases where
an officer remembers having given a loud and
clear statement of his identity and purpose before
entering an apartment although the apartment
manager who was present does not remember
anything being said; cases where defendants in
lineups spontaneously "apologize" to victims who
have identified them.100 A striking increase in the
number of such cases will not go unnoticed by the
bench or bar. The police will lose much more in the
long run unless there is the complete honesty on
matters affecting a motion to suppress that we
99 Kuh, The Mapp Case One Year After: An Ap-
praisal Of Its Impact In New York, 148 N. Y. L. J. 4
(September 18, 1962).
100 See Veney v. United States, 344 F.2d 542 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (Concurring opinion of Wright, J.).
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expect in a trial on the issue of guilt. An increase in
improbable testimony is an open invitation for
courts to adopt inflexible rules which do not
depend on such testimony.
I feel required to comment briefly upon the
A. L. I. Model Code. Like Mr. Broderick, the
warning provisions give me trouble, but for dif-
ferent reasons. I cannot think that he is serious
when he suggests that because we have no obliga-
tion to inform a citizen of his duty not to break the
law, that it follows that we should have no obliga-
tion to inform him of his rights when he is ar-
rested.'0' I do question how much effect a warning
of the right to remain silent and of his right to
counsel will have in the context of an incom-
municado interrogation. Experience in the military
indicates that few choose to remain silent after a
warning. I doubt if there will be much difference in
a police station.
Experience with Federal Rule 5 prior to the
passage of the Criminal Justice Act bears witness
to the fact that a warning of the right to counsel is
of little assistance to the indigent, unless the
person giving the warning is able to make counsel
available if the defendant seeks to exercise his
right."°2 At least the Commentary reflects the view
that the government should not block a suspect's
access to counsel if a legal aid organization is able
to supply it."'
The warning of the privilege against self-
incrimination may place the defendant in a di-
lemma. If he talks, his statement is admissible. If
he is warned of his right to remain silent, and does
so in the face of an accusation of guilt, his silence
may be admitted against him in some jurisdictions
unless we change the case law now on the books."4
Space precludes a section by section critique of
the Code. I hold the draftsmen in high esteem. My
principal disagreements with them and the Code
revolve around a difference in basic philosophy
concerning the appropriate structure of a system
for the administration of justice in a free society.
I like the philosophy which the Court has been
enunciating during the last two decades. They do
not.
I find relatively few novel ideas reflected in the
' Address by Vincent L. Broderick, The Supreme
Court and the Police: A Police Viewpoint, April 29,
1966.
101 See Fifth Annual Report of the Legal Aid Agency
for the District of Columbia, 20 (1965).
03 A. L. I., A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGGNENT
PROCEDURE, Art. 4, Sec. 4.01 (d) (Tentative Draft
No. 1).
Code. To a considerable extent the provisions
dealing with detention reflect the arguments un-
successfully advanced by the Government in
Rios,1"5 after the concession in Henry."'1 I suspect
that the Code rejects the concept of probable
cause enunciated by the Court in Johnson,1"'
although concededly this is unclear. The pro-
visions dealing with interrogation reject the
philosophy expressed in Mallory"' while codifying
specific prohibitions enunciated in the involuntary
confession cases. (A comparison of the briefs in
Mallory and Escobedo with the commentary to the
Code makes interesting reading.) The bail pro-
visions permit bond to be set initially by a police
officer in felony cases in accordance with a fixed
scale,"°9 a procedure not calculated to result in a
figure which is set after consideration of "the
nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
the weight of the evidence against him, the
financial ability of the defendant to give bail, the
character of the defendant, and the policy against
unnecessary detention of defendants pending
trial."' The sections dealing with the exclusionary
rule provide considerable leeway to permit the
lower courts to refuse to apply it in many cases,
with the predictable effect of rendering it less
effective as a means of discouraging police mis-
conduct."'
The combined effect of the provisions of the Code
is a procedure which is different than the one which
the Court has been erecting through decisions
interpreting the Bill of Rights during the last two
decades. I agree with Judge Friendly that a Code
is desirable,"' but the issue is what kind of Code;
one which attempts to ignore or avoid the decisions
of the Supreme Court, or one which attempts to
clarify and implement them? I think that it is
wishful thinking to assume that the Court will
adopt a different view toward arrest, detention, or
interrogation simply because certain practices are
permitted by the Code.
Let me give you an example. Assume the case
of a 19-year-old Negro citizen who drives a new
10 Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 65 F.2d 824
(D.C. Cir. 1933).
0' Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
10 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 253 (1960).
07 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
"' Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
09 A. L, I., A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE, Art. 8 (Tentative Draft No. 1).
"' FED. R. CRIM. P. 46.
M' A. L. I., A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE, Art. 9 (Tentative Draft No. 1).
1 See Friendly, The Bill of Rights As a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REv. 929 (1965).
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car into an all white section of a city about mid-
night. A police officer observes him alighting from
the car and entering an alley. He is wearing
sneakers and carrying a sack. The circumstances
are such that they suggest to the officer that the
Negro is about to commit a crime although he has
no suspicion, much less probable cause, to believe
that an offense has been committed. The officer
orders the suspect to stop. He complies. Without
a warning of any kind the officer asks him to
identify himself. He complies. The officer asks him
what he is doing in the alley and the suspect says
that he does not have to answer such questions and
turns to leave. The officer stops him and frisks
him. No weapon is found but a pair of car keys
indicating an out of state registration is found. The
officer asks him whether the car belongs to him.
The suspect remains silent. The officer then tells
him that he has no legal obligation to respond and
then repeats the question. The suspect states that
it belongs to his father who lives outside of the
state. The officer again asks him what he was
doing in the alley. The suspect stated that he was
taking a walk. Further questions result in similar
responses. As a result of the suspect's answers
following the frisk, the officer concludes that he
has a "substantial objective" basis for believing
that the suspect has committed a crime although
he has not yet determined whether, or with what,
to charge him.
The suspect is taken to the precinct and is
formally warned of his rights. He has no relatives
in the city and has been in the city only a few
weeks. He asks to see a lawyer. He is told that he
may retain a lawyer but that no lawyer will be
appointed for him. He states that he has no
money and does not know any lawyer. The police
tell him they are sorry. He is interrogated for four
hours in the absence of a lawyer. He continues to
insist that he had planned no crime and was
committing none when he was apprehended.
During the four hours the police ascertain that the
car he was driving had been stolen earlier in the
evening. When confronted with the owner, he
admits that he took the car but claims that he was
joy riding.
A report is received of a burglary in a different
section of town about 10:00 P.M. A car of similar
description was seen leaving the area in which the
burglary was committed. The defendant is asked
about the burglary but denies involvement. The
police determine that there is reasonable cause to
believe that further investigation and custody are
necessary to determine whether the suspect should
be charged with the felony of burglary. At 4:15
A.M. the station officer orders that the defendant
be detained for a period of further screening. The
suspect is detained until 12 noon on the next day.
During the seven and one half hours of additional
detention he is not subjected to sustained interro-
gation. The police continue to investigate the case.
On three occasions they return and confront him
with the evidence and ask him whether he wishes
to make a statement. On the first two occasions he
declines and again asks to see a lawyer. On the
third occasion he states that he was in a bar with
a friend in another section of town when the
burglary occurred. The police check out the alibi
and the friend denies the story. The police then
confront the defendant who, eleven hours after his
arrest, admits his guilt. Twelve hours after his
apprehension he is brought before a magistrate.
At his trial for burglary and unauthorized use of
a motor vehicle the statement made to the police
officer at the time of the initial detention and his
confession are admitted into evidence.
It is my understanding that these statements
would be admissible under the Code. I do not
think that the Supreme Court would sustain a
conviction based on the statements, although I am
not prepared to predict whether the opinion would
be predicated upon a violation of the fourth
amendment, an impairment of the privilege against
self-incrimination, deprivation of counsel, in-
voluntariness, or a combination of these factors.
You may disagree with me on either proposition.
My point is that we must decide whether the Code
permits what the Court has prohibited or is likely
to prohibit. No useful purpose will be served if we
adopt a Code which provides no more definitive
guidelines to the police than now exist. The
flexibility of the due process clause remains un-
restricted by the specificity of Code provisions.
We would be better off if we devoted our energies
to the task of training police forces to live with the
Constitution rather than attempting to avoid the




U. S. DismTIC COURT FOR THE DIsTRICT oF COLUMBIA, CRUmNAL DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF BY
TYPE OF DIsPOsITION, FiscAL YEARS ENDED JUNE 30, 1955-1965
Year 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
TotalNo. Defendants..... 1,595 1,454 1,666 1,642 1,367 1,337 1,282 1,183 1,442 1,286
Total No. Defendants
Convicted ............. 1,219 1,199 1,265 1,324 1,089 1,079 988 916 1,115 981
Pct of Charged Defendants
Convicted ............. 76.4 82.5 75.9 80.6 79.7 80.4 77.1 77.4 77.3 76.2
Total No. Defendants Ac-
quitted, Found not
Guilty by Reason of
Insanity, or indictment
dismissed .............. 376 255 401 318 278 258 294 267 327 305
Pct acquittals, Not Guilty
by Reason of Insanity
& Dismissals ........... 23.6 17.5 24.1 19.4 20.3 19.3 22.9 22.6 22.7 23.8
No. Defendants Im-
prisoned .............. 906 812 896 905 733 774 718 681 805 681
Pct Convicted Defendants
Imprisoned ............ 74.3 67.7 70.8 68.4 67.3 71.7 72.7 74.3 72.2 69.4
Source: Hearing of the Committee of the District of Columbia 89th Cong. 1st Sess. on H.R. 5688 & S. 1526,
S. 1320, S. 1632, S. 1718 & S. 1719, Part 1. p. 351 Table 1. The 1965 figures were obtained from Mr. McCafferty
of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts by Mr. Peter S. Ring.
APPENDIX 1:1
NUMBER OF INDICTmENTS RETURNED AND IGNORED
IN U. S. DiSTRIcT COURT FOR THE DIs~rIcT OF
COLUMBIA DURING FIvE MONTH PERIODS NovEm-
BER 1963-MAuCH 1964; NOVEMBER 1964-MAtcd
1965; NOVEMBER 1965-MARcr 1966
III Ill
Nov 1963-Mfarch 1964 Nov 1964-March Nov 1965-March1965 1966
Total Indictments
459 J 527 j 488
Indictments Ignored or Returned for Prosecution as
Misdemeanant
125 1 155 108
Selected Offenses
Aggravated As-
saults ....... 72 80 83
CDW/PPW... 58 47 32
Murder ....... 24 26 26
Manslaughter.. 3 5 6
Housebreaking.. 79 82 69
UUV.......... 56 61 48
Robbery ....... 73 111 88
Rape .......... 8 11 11
Data was collected from Grand Jury Records by
Peter S. Ring. Each different type of crime was counted
in indictments containing multiple counts; i.e. an
indictment charging UUV, ADW, & Robbery was
APPENDIX III
Year Total No Part Total No Part Clearancet of1 Oeolses ffeln C PartcOffenses
1956 17610 10048 50.2
1957 15554 9158 49.5
1958 17047 9925 51.0
1959 Not available
1960 19929 11714 48.3
1961 21802 12948 44.7
1962 21534 13274 43.3
1963 23194 15191 40.9
1964 28469 19693 38.1





not reported by Metropolitan Police
as such-they were arrived at by sub-
misdemeanors included in Part One of-
This data was collected by Mr. Peter S. Ring from
the Annual Reports of the Metropolitan Police De-
partment, Washington, D. C.
APPENDIX IV
















Data was collected from Records of the Metro-
politan Police Department by Mr. Peter S. Ring.
APPENDIX V
DISPOSITION OF CRIMNAL CASES IN T U. S. Dis-
TRICT COURT AND THE U. S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, FISCAL
YEAR 1965
Criminal Cases in the U. S. District Court Fiscal Year
1965
Number of pleas of guilty ............ 638
Cases Tried:
Convictions on trial by jury ........ 209
Convictions on trial by court without
jury ........................... 18
Acquitted ........................ 60
Not guilty by reason of insanity ....... 38
325
Dismissals (about 95% before trial)... 2151
1178
Appeals to the U. S. Court of Appeals during the
same period
Total number of appeals ............. 268
Disposition by Court of Appeals:
Affirmed ........................ 164
Dismissed, leaving action of District
Court in effect .................. 49
213
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 55




By Court of Appeals ............... 3
By District Court ................. 11
Case M ooted ..................... 1 15
Pending in District Court ............ 12
Retried, resulting in conviction ....... 15
Retried, resulting in acquittal ........ 2
Lesser pleas of guilty accepted ....... 11
55
[Note: Except for the 12 pending cases to which final
result was not known at the end of the year, only
16 cases out of 268 appeals resulted in the accused
eventually going free. This is out of a total of 963
cases which resulted in guilty pleas or trials, or
1178 cases disposed of in the District Court.]
'Dismissed because witnesses unavailable, com-
plaining witnesses refused to testify, change in the
law, etc.
Source: This data was compiled by the Honorable
Nathan J. Paulson, Clerk, United States Court of
Appeals, on the basis of the records in his office and
information obtained from the United States Dis-
trict Court and the Office of the United States Attor-
ney. The categorizing of the data rests upon the
judgment of Mr. Paulson alone. Only direct appeals
from criminal judgments are included. The report is
included in statistical information being collected
by the Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure of
Georgetown University Law Center.
